A Theory of Banking Crises (Part 1) by Keiichiro Kobayashi
%1
RIETI Discussion Paper Series 03-E-016
A Theory of Banking Crises (Part 1)
KOBAYASHI Keiichiro
RIETI
The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/RIETI Discussion Paper Series 03-E-016 
 










In order to protect the public's confidence in deposit money, governments 
usually guarantee bank deposits implicitly or through an explicit deposit 
insurance system. Thus bank insolvency does not induce immediate bank 
runs. In many episodes of banking crises, several years passed quietly after 
bank insolvency had occurred, with the insolvency continuing to develop 
under the surface, and the rash of bank failures broke out only when the 
bank insolvency exceeded a certain level. 
In this paper I present a simple model that describes the dynamics of 
bank insolvency in a form that eventually results in banking system failure 
or bank recapitalization by the government. The main results are as follows: 
(1) The government cannot indefinitely postpone recognizing the fiscal loss 
associated with bank insolvency. (2) The consumption level is too high (low) 
before (after) bank recapitalization compared with the optimal level. Thus 
the price conditions become deflationary (inflationary) before (after) bank 
recapitalization. (3) Social welfare decreases as bank recapitalization is 
delayed. 
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Abstract
In modern economies, bank deposits play an important role as a means of pay-
ment. On the one hand, deposits are private liabilities of banks, and on the other
hand, they are public goods: deposit money. In order to protect the public’s conﬁ-
dence in deposit money, governments usually guarantee bank deposits implicitly or
through an explicit deposit insurance system. Thus bank insolvency does not in-
duce immediate bank runs. In many episodes of banking crises, several years passed
quietly after bank insolvency had occurred, with the insolvency continuing to de-
velop under the surface, and the rash of bank failures broke out only when the bank
insolvency exceeded a certain level.
In this paper I present a simple model that describes the dynamics of bank
insolvency in a form that eventually results in banking system failure or bank recap-
italization by the government. The main results are as follows: (1) Banking system
failure or bank recapitalization by the government takes place in a ﬁnite period of
time: i.e., the government cannot indeﬁnitely postpone recognizing the ﬁscal loss
associated with bank insolvency. (2) The consumption level is too high (low) before
1(after) bank recapitalization compared with the optimal level. Thus the price con-
ditions become deﬂationary (inﬂationary) before (after) bank recapitalization. (3)
Social welfare decreases as bank recapitalization is delayed.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E31, E59, E63, G21.
Keywords: Bank insolvency, deposit money, price level determination, bank recapi-
talization.
1 Introduction
In the recent episodes of banking crises, the crises have developed through the following
dynamics (Caprio and Klingebiel [1997]). First of all bank insolvency develops as a
r e s u l to fac o l l a p s eo fa na s s e t - p r i c eb u b b l eo ri n c r e a s ei ni n e ﬃcient lending.1 Even
though insolvency becomes severe, bank failures are prevented for several years by deposit
guarantees from the government or liquidity support from the central bank. Under the
surface, though, the bank insolvency continues to swell as time passes, and a system-wide
rash of bank failures breaks out at the point when the bank insolvency becomes apparent
to the general public or market participants.
This pattern of crisis development is consistent with many episodes of banking crises,
such as in the United States (1980s) and Japan (1990s).
One major factor that produces this dynamic, it seems to me, is the special role of
bank deposits. In modern economies, bank deposits play an important role as a means
of payment. On the one hand, they are private liabilities of banks, and on the other
hand, they are public goods: deposit money. In order to protect the public’s conﬁdence
in deposit money, governments usually guarantee bank deposits implicitly or through an
explicit deposit insurance system. If bank deposits were unprotected private liabilities
just like ordinary corporate debts, the occurrence of bank insolvency would trigger bank
runs immediately, and the losses associated with bank insolvency would be recognized
1Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) deﬁne the onset of a systemic bank insolvency as a time when the ratio
of nonperfoming loans to total loans exceeds 5—10 percent.
2and borne by the depositors immediately. Since, however, the government guarantees
bank deposits and the central bank provides liquidity to support the banking system,
bank runs do not necessarily happen when banks become insolvent. As a result, even
after bank insolvency occurs, deposit money backed by no bank assets can continue to
circulate for a considerable period of time.
Unbacked deposit money is an implicit liability of the government. If the government
decides that it is unwilling to let depositors bear the losses resulting from bank insol-
vency, it has no other choice than to make up for the losses itself, ultimately meaning
the use of taxpayers’ money. In what follows, I use the term bank recapitalization to
refer to this form of banking system recapitalization through the injection of taxpayers’
money. To inject taxpayer’s money into the banking system is an unpopular policy and
politically diﬃcult to implement. The government usually tries to put oﬀ recognizing
bank insolvency and making up for the losses. Therefore, the government is tempted to
continue an unsustainable policy: on the one hand, it declares deposit guarantees and
provides liquidity support, and on the other hand, it postpones bank recapitalization.
The model in this paper describes the development of bank insolvency and the re-
sponse of macroeconomic variables under this unsustainable policy. There is a literature
in which the response of an economy to an unsustainable policy is theoretically exam-
ined, namely, the research on balance of payment crises (Krugman [1979], Calvo [1987]).
In the models of BOP crises, a policy of ﬁxing the exchange rate at unsustainable level
causes the crisis. The intuition of my model is similar. In my model, the unsustainable
policy (deposit guarantees without bank recapitalization) causes an ineﬃcient outcome.2
The paper which is closest to this paper is Dekle and Kletzer (2003). While I developed
this model independently, the structure of my model is qualitatively very close to theirs,
with some diﬀerences in the policy lessons: They stress that the stringent supervision
that requires loan-loss reserving by banks is important to prevent the banking crisis,
while I argue that quick recapitalization of banks are necessary once the banking system
2The structure of the model is similar to Calvo (2003) in which an unexpected increase in the public
debt aﬀects the economic activities through the distortionary tax system.
3falls into insolvency as a result of an exogenous shock.
There are some empirical ﬁndings on banking crises that are consistent with this
model: (1) Output losses following a banking crisis are observed for a surprisingly long
period of time (Boyd, Kwak, and Smith [2002]). (2) In a country that experienced a
single crisis, the inﬂation rate typically falls after the onset of the bank insolvency (Boyd
et al. [2001]). (3) Open-ended liquidity support and unlimited deposit guarantees are
signiﬁcant contributors to the ﬁscal cost of a banking crisis (Honohan and Klingebiel
[2000]).
The organization of this paper is as follows: In the next section, I present the basic
structure of the model. In Section 3, I introduce bank insolvency caused by an unex-
pected macroeconomic shock, and I describe the development of the banking crisis in
an environment of deposit guarantees and postponed bank recapitalization. Section 4
provides concluding remarks.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
The economy continues for an inﬁnite period from date 0. In this economy, consumption
takes place at date t (t =0 ,1,2,···), and production takes place in a period between
dates t and t + 1. I call the period between dates t and t +1p e r i o dt. This economy
consists of one government and continua of consumers, ﬁrms, and banks. Each continuum
(of consumers, ﬁrms, and banks) is of measure 1. The consumers are inﬁnitely long-lived




where ct is consumption at date t,a n dβ is the discount factor, and u(c)i sac o n c a v e
and increasing function of c. I assume for simplicity that u(c)=l nc.A tt h eb e g i n n i n g
of date 0, the consumers are endowed with k units of the consumer goods and B units
of the nominal government bond.
I assume that consumers, ﬁrms, and banks act as price takers as a result of competi-
tion in each sector. I also make the following assumption about the medium of exchange
4in this economy:
Assumption 1 Money consists of either bank deposits or government bonds. All trans-
actions between a consumer and a ﬁrm must be mediated by money. A consumer and a
ﬁr mc a n n o tl e n dt oo rb o r r o wf r o me a c ho t h e rd i r e c t l y .
Firms and production technology This economy is a one-good economy in which
the consumer good is the only good. The production technology of a ﬁrm is as follows:
An input of kt units of the good at date t produces Akt units of the good (A>1) at date
t +1 . O n l yﬁrms have this production technology. The input kt depreciates completely
to zero during the process of production in period t.
I assume that ﬁrms continue for only one period. A ﬁrm of period t is established at
date t, buys inputs kt from consumers and produces the good during period t.A td a t e
t + 1 it sells all of the output Akt to consumers, distributes any proﬁtt h a ti th a sm a d e




Πt = Pt+1Ak − RL
t Ptk, (2)
where Πt is the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm, Pt is the price level at date t,a n dRL
t is the nominal
rate of return on bank loans in period t.( RL
t =1+IL
t ,w h e r eIL
t is the nominal rate of
interest of bank loans in period t.) In order to simplify the analysis of the equilibrium,





Circulation of bank deposits I assume that banks continue operating for inﬁnite pe-
riods. In this model, bank failure is represented by bank recapitalization, i.e., a situation
where the government is forced to make up for the losses from bank insolvency.
Banks make loans by creating deposits and giving them to ﬁr m si nr e t u r nf o ra
promise of future repayment. I make the following assumption about contracts between
banks and depositors and between ﬁrms and banks:
5Assumption 2 Bank deposits and bank loans of period t are debt contracts in which the
principal and the interest payment are ﬁxed at date t and cannot be changed at date t+1.
Debt contracts are used for ﬁnancing in this economy for some microeconomic reasons
that are not speciﬁed in this model. For example, agency problems associated with in-
formation asymmetry can justify the use of debt contracts (see Gale and Helwig [1985]).3
At date t,aﬁrm borrows Ptkt units of deposit money from a bank in order to buy
kt units of the good as an input, promising to repay RL
t Ptkt to the bank at date t +1 ,
where RL
t is the nominal rate of return on the bank loan. In making the loan, the bank
creates a deposit with a nominal value of Ptkt,a n dg i v e si tt ot h eﬁrm: i.e., the ﬁrm
becomes the holder of the bank deposit Ptkt.4 The ﬁrm buys kt units of the good from
a consumer in exchange for the bank deposit Ptkt. The settlement of this transaction is
made by changing the holder of the bank deposit Ptkt from the ﬁrm to the consumer.











t Lt − RtDt}, subject to Lt = Dt, (4)
3That the principal and interest are ﬁxed ex ante in the bank deposit contract is closely related to
the unique characteristic of the bank deposit that it is demandable. In order for depositors to have the
right to withdraw any amount of their deposit at any time, the total amount of their deposit must be
pre-ﬁxed. The demandable nature of bank deposits must be the reason why they are used as a close
substitute of cash and a means of payments in reality. Since I made an assumption that bank deposits
are used as money (Assumption 1), the fact that deposits are demandable does not play any role in this
model. Thus the reason why bank deposits are demandable is not speciﬁed in this model either: The
need to prevent hold-up problems associated with relation-speciﬁcity in lending technology may drive
banks to oﬀer demand deposits to depositors (see Diamond and Rajan [2001]).
4For readers who consider the notion of deposit creation awkward, here is an alternative explanation
for bank lending. Suppose that the consumer deposits a portion of their holdings of the government
bond Bt−1 i nt h eb a n k . T h eb a n kl e n d sLt units of the bonds to a ﬁrm, and makes the ﬁrm deposit
back the bonds in the bank immediately. At this point in time, the bank has the bonds (Bt−1)a n dt h e
loan (Lt) in the asset side, and the deposits from the consumers (Bt−1)a n df r o mt h eﬁrm (Lt)i nt h e
liability side. Repeating this process, the bank can make loans larger than its bond holdings. Suppose
that the consumers, who are indiﬀerent between the bonds and the bank deposits, withdraw the bonds
(Bt−1)a f t e rt h eb a n km a d el o a n s( Ptkt)t oﬁrms. At this point in time, the bank has the loans (Ptkt)
in the asset side, and the deposits (Ptkt) in the liability side. Therefore, the deposits Ptkt are created.
6where Rt is the nominal rate of return on bank deposits. In the competitive equilibrium,
( 2 )a n d( 4 )i m p l yt h a t
RL




We can show that the bank deposit (Ptkt) is cleared at date t + 1 in this competitive
equilibrium: At date t + 1, the consumer’s bank deposit has grown to RtPtkt.T h e
ﬁrm sells the output Akt to the consumer and receives the proceeds Pt+1Akt.I n t h e
competitive equilibrium where Pt+1A = RtPt, the proceeds are equal to the consumer’s
bank deposit. Thus the consumer buys the good Akt from the ﬁrm by paying the entire
bank deposit RtPtkt to the ﬁrm. At this point in time, the bank has a loan RL
t Ptkt to
the ﬁrm, and the ﬁrm has a bank deposit RtPtkt. In the competitive equilibrium where
RL
t = Rt, the repayment from the ﬁrm to the bank is made by oﬀsetting the loan with
the deposit. Therefore, in the competitive equilibrium, the deposit created at date t is
cleared at date t +1 .
Government bonds and the price level The government issues bonds at each date
t and redeems them using revenue from a consumption tax. The government bonds are
a liquid asset (see Assumption 1). Thus a consumer (or a ﬁrm) holding bonds can freely
exchange them for a bank deposit of the same nominal value. Bank recapitalization
in Section 3 is a policy under which the government gives the bonds to depositors in
exchange for bank deposits that are not backed by bank assets.
The government budget constraint is as follows:
τ0P0c0 = B − B0,
τtPtct = Rt−1Bt−1 − Bt, for t ≥ 1,
(6)
where B is the initial amount of the bonds held by consumers and τt i st h er a t eo f
consumption tax at date t. The left-hand side of (6) is the tax revenue. The government
can choose the values of τt and Bt under the constraint that (6) is satisﬁed.
We can interpret that the equations (6) determine the price level Pt,g i v e nt h eg o v -
ernment’s policy choice of values (τt, Bt). This interpretation is the same as the logic of
7price determination in the ﬁscal theory of price levels (see Woodford [2001], Cochrane
[2000]).
I have assumed that there is only one kind of taxation: a consumption tax. This
assumption is for simplicity of analysis, and the results do not change qualitatively even
if the government can tax income (Ptkt). But the following assumption is crucial for the
r e s u l t so ft h i sp a p e r :
Assumption 3 The government cannot impose a lump-sum tax on consumers.
If the government uses a lump-sum tax to ﬁnance the cost of bank recapitalization, the
consumption level becomes optimal. Thus a delay in bank recapitalization does not have
any eﬀect on social welfare in this case. But in this economy bank recapitalization using
a lump-sum tax on consumers is nearly equivalent to defaults on bank deposits that
destroy the credibility of bank deposits as money. Thus I assume that the government
cannot impose a lump-sum tax on consumers since it wants to maintain the public’s
conﬁdence in deposit money.









(1 + τ0)P0c0 + P0k0 + D0 + B0 ≤ P0k + B + P0k0,
(1 + τt)Ptct + Ptkt + Dt + Bt ≤ Rt−1(Dt−1 + Bt−1)+Ptkt + Πt, for t ≥ 1,
(7)
where k is the consumer’s initial holdings of the good at date 0 and Dt is the consumer’s
bank deposit remaining at date t.T h et e r mPtkt in the left-hand side of the consumer’s
budget constraint is the payment from the consumer to a ﬁrm of period t − 1f o rt h e
purchase of kt, while the term Ptkt in the right-hand side is the proceeds from selling kt
to a ﬁrm of period t.
The government’s budget constraint (6), the consumer’s budget constraint (7), and
the resource constraints
c0 + k0 = k,
ct + kt = Akt−1 for t ≥ 1,
(8)
8imply
Dt = Ptkt for t ≥ 0. (9)
Since I have assumed that u(ct)=l n ct,t h eﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) of the













The last equality follows from A = β−1.
Maximizing (1) subject to (8), we obtain the socially optimal allocation of consump-
tion:
ct = c∗ =( 1− β)k, and kt = k∗ = βk, for all t ≥ 0. (11)
The condition (10) implies that this optimal allocation is attained in the competitive
equilibrium if the tax rate τt i ss e ta tac o n s t a n tr a t e . ( T h ep r i c el e v e lPt and the
nominal return Rt can vary under a constant tax rate if Bt varies.)
For simplicity I assume that the tax rate and the volume of bond issuance is time
invariant: τt = τ∗ and Bt = B∗ ≡ βB for all t ≥ 0. In this case the equilibrium price
becomes (Pt,R t)=( P∗,R ∗) ≡ (
(A−1)B∗
τ∗c∗ ,A), and the equilibrium allocation becomes
(ct,k t)=( c∗,k∗). This equilibrium is the social optimum.
3 Banking Crisis
I assume that, at date 0, all agents in the economy expected that the economy would
follow the optimal path (Pt,R t,c t,k t)=( P∗,R ∗,c ∗,k∗). The banks created P∗k∗ units
of bank deposits and lent them to ﬁrms. The nominal rate of return for period 0 (from
d a t e0t od a t e1 )w a sﬁxed at R∗.A td a t e0 ,ﬁrms made a promise to repay R∗P∗k∗ to
banks at date 1, and banks made a promise to repay R∗P∗k∗ to depositors at date 1.
I assume that an unexpected macroeconomic shock (λ) hit the economy at a time
between date 0 and date 1, where
0 < λ < 1, (12)
9and λ is close to 1. This shock completely destroyed the output of 1 − λ ﬁrms. Thus at
date 1, λ ﬁrms produce the output Ak∗, while the other 1 − λ ﬁrms produce nothing.
The total production at date 1 becomes λAk∗. In this case, the optimal allocation from
date 1 onward becomes ct = co ≡ λc∗, and kt = ko ≡ λk∗.
Bank insolvency Based on the above assumptions, let us now examine the process of
payments after the unexpected shock λ hits the economy.
At date 1, banks have assets (loans) of P∗Ak∗. But since 1−λ ﬁrms failed to produce
any output, the banks cannot recover their loans to them. These ﬁrms go bankrupt at
date 1. Thus the banks have irrecoverable loans with a face value of (1 − λ)P∗Ak∗.
Next we assume that the new equilibrium price at date 1 becomes P.T h ep r i c eP may
be either greater or less than P∗. The amount the bank can collect from the remaining
λ ﬁrms is λmin{P,P∗}Ak∗. Therefore, the total amount of irrecoverable loans at date
1i sN1,w h e r e
N1 =
∙





Meanwhile, at date 1, the consumers have bank deposits of R∗P∗k∗ = P∗Ak∗,o u to f
which they use λPAk∗ to purchase the outputs. (We can take it that the consumption tax
τ∗Pc1 is paid with a part of consumers’ holdings of government bonds [R∗B∗], since the
equation τ∗Pc1 = R∗B∗ − B1 must hold ex post in the new equilibrium for nonnegative
B1.) The total proﬁts of ﬁrms at date 1 are λmax{P −P∗,0}Ak∗, which are paid out to
the consumers in equal dividends. Therefore, after all the transactions on period 0 output
are over, the remaining bank deposits of consumers are P∗Ak∗ − λpAk∗ + λmax{P −
P∗,0}Ak∗ =( 1− λ)P∗Ak∗ + λmax{P∗ − P,0}Ak∗ = N1.
The ﬁrms of period 0 are all liquidated at date 1. Therefore, at date 1, the banks have
irrecoverable loans of N1 o nt h ea s s e ts i d ea n du n c l e a r e dd e p o s i t so fN1 from consumers
on the liability side.
If bank deposits were perceived as private liabilities like ordinary debts of ﬁrms, and
if the government did not guarantee them, the irrecoverable loans N1 and the unbacked
deposits N1 would be immediately written oﬀ at date 1 with the entire cost N1 being
10borne by the consumers as a lump sum. After this immediate adjustment, the new
equilibrium prices (Pt = 1
λP∗,R t = A for t ≥ 1) and the optimal allocation (ct =
co,k t = ko) would be realized.
But in this economy, where the bank deposits circulate as money, the government does
not allow the occurrence of defaults on bank deposits, nor do the economic agents expect
the government to allow such defaults. Thus the expectation prevails that the government
will make up for the losses from bank insolvency by paying the cost of guaranteeing the
deposits of failed banks or by injecting taxpayers’ money into the insolvent banks.
But this does not necessarily mean that the government must recapitalize banks at
date 1. As long as people believe that the government will make up for the losses from
bank insolvency sometime in the future, the public’s conﬁdence in deposit money is
maintained.5 The unbacked deposits N1 will grow to Nt = {
Qt
s=1 Rs}N1 at date t.S i n c e
the banks consider that the government will make up for the loss (Nt)i nt h ef u t u r e ,
the unbacked deposit Nt does not appear in the bank’s proﬁt maximization; the banks
have the unbacked deposit Nt in the liability side, while they have the asset Nt, i.e., the
(implicit) deposit guarantee from the government. Therefore, the bank’s problem is still
(4).
Next I will describe the competitive equilibrium in which the date of bank recapital-
ization is not date 1 and Nt circulates in the economy as money.6
5 Otherwise the conﬁdence will collapse. If this happens, the write-oﬀ of N1 occurs immediately,
and transactions among economic agents become impossible (for a while) because bank deposits are
money in this cashless economy. Thus we assume that the loss of conﬁdence in deposit money generates
prohibitively high social costs.
6Note that a positive productivity shock at another date cannot help banks to recover the loans Nt,
since in the loan contracts the repayments are ﬁxed competitively before the shock hits the economy. For
example, suppose that an unexpected macroeconomic shock at date t (t ≥ 1) changes the productivity
from A to A+². In this case, banks cannot recover Nt from ﬁrms since the repayments to the banks are
ﬁxed at date t − 1. Firms’ proﬁts from the productiviy increase are distributed to consumers, and thus
the unbacked deposits (Nt) of the consumers do not decrease. Therefore, the problem of bank insolvency
persists even if the economy is hit by both negative and positive shocks at diﬀerent dates.
11Equilibrium in which banks are recapitalized at date T In reality, bank recapi-
talization is not a popular policy. Therefore, the government of a country hit by a banking
crisis usually puts oﬀ recognizing the crisis and paying the costs of bank recapitalization.
In order to formalize this postponement of bank recapitalization in my model, I
assume that immediately after the shock λ hits the economy, the following expectation
prevails:
Assumption 4 People expect that the government will give NT units of bonds to the
consumers in exchange for the unbacked deposit NT at date T (T>1), and that the
government will change the tax policy (τt) only at date T.
Under this assumption, equation (10) implies that the consumption is invariant from
d a t e1t od a t eT − 1, and from date T onward. Therefore, to simplify the analysis I
assume that the economy stays in a steady state until date T − 1a n dm o v e st oa n o t h e r
steady state at date T. The economic variables can be written as follows:7
Pt = P,ct = c,τt = τ∗,B t = B∗, for t ≤ T − 1, (14)
Pt = P0,c t = c0,k t = k0,τt = τ0,B t = B0, for t ≥ T. (15)
At date T,t h eg o v e r n m e n tp a y sNT units of the bonds to the depositors in order to
make up for the losses from bank insolvency. Thus the constraint at date T becomes
τ0P0c0 = RT−1B∗ + NT − B0.
Proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms implies Pt
Pt+1Rt = Rt = A.T h e r e f o r e ,Nt = At−1N1 for
t ≤ T − 1. Since the nominal rate of return from date T − 1t od a t eT is RT−1 = AP0
P ,
the amount of the bonds that the government must give to the banks is




The government’s budget constraint is
τ∗Pc= AB∗ − B∗, for t ≤ T − 1, (17)
7I assumed that the economy jumps to the latter steady state at date T. The results do not change
qualitatively even if I assume that the values of the variables at date T are allowed to be diﬀerent from
those of the period from date T +1o n w a r d .
12τ0P0c0 = RT−1B∗ + NT − B0, for t = T, (18)


























Given that (τt,B t)=( τ∗,B∗)f o rt ≤ T − 1, the condition (22) implies that the govern-
ment must raise the tax rate τ0 if it delays bank recapitalization.
Since the economy is in a steady state from date T onward, the resource constraints




















If P ≥ P∗, this condition reduces to 1+τ∗
1+τ0 =1− (1 − λ)AT−1, which determines the
relationship between T and τ0 uniquely. If the government chooses a larger τ0 for a
given T, the condition (24) determines the price level P(<P ∗). But I assume that the
government benevolently chooses the smallest value of τ0 for a given T. In this case, (24)
implies that the equilibrium price P w i l lb eg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt oP∗.( I t i s s h o w n
that P = P∗ in the equilibrium. See equation (29).)
Then (13) implies NT−1 = AT−1(1 − λ)P∗k∗.F r o m( 2 4 )w eh a v e
τ0 =
AT−1(1 − λ)+τ∗
1 − (1 − λ)AT−1 . (25)
If a ﬁnite and positive value of τ0 does not satisfy (25) for a given T, there exists no
equilibrium. So we have the following lemma:
13Lemma 1 The government must choose the date of bank recapitalization (T)s ot h a t
T ≤ T, (26)
where T is the largest integer less than or equal to 1−
ln(1−λ)
lnA .T h et a xr a t eτ0 is determined
by (25), and the amount of the government bonds B0 is determined by B0 = 1
A(RT−1B∗+
NT).
This lemma says that the government can delay the date of bank recapitalization only
up to T.8
Since T is an increasing function of λ, the maximum time that the government can
postpone bank recapitalization becomes shorter as N1 =( 1− λ)AP∗k∗ becomes larger.
What will happen if the government declares that it will postpone bank recapital-
ization beyond date T? The above lemma implies that there is no equilibrium in which
the expectation of recapitalization at T>T prevails. Therefore, no one will believe the
government’s declaration. But on the other hand, it is feasible for the government to
postpone bank recapitalization until T. Thus if the government declares its intention to
recapitalize at T>T, people will believe that the government will be forced to make up
for the losses from bank insolvency at date T, since otherwise the conﬁdence in deposit
money will collapse at that point and the government will incur prohibitively high social
costs (see footnote 5).
For T ≤ T, the equilibrium consumption becomes
c = c∗ for t ≤ T − 1, (27)
8This result appears to depend crucially on the fact that the real rate of return on assets is A.B u tw e
can show the existence of an upper bound for T in a more general setting. The necessary assumptions are
(1) the real rate of return has a lower bound r, which is greater than 1; (2) the output yt is ﬁnite for all





∗, it increases unboundedly as time passes. On the




t−sys)i sﬁnite. Therefore, there exists T such that
Nt
Pt <G t for t ≤ T and
Nt
Pt >G t for
t>T .S i n c e f o r t>Tthe government cannot make up for the loss Nt with any ﬁscal policy under
the no-Ponzi condition, T is the time limit for bank recapitalization. For example, this result holds in




t )a n dt h ec o n s u m e r
is endowed with a constant amount of labor nt =1a te a c hd a t e .
14c0 = {1 − (1 − λ)AT−1}c∗ for t ≥ T. (28)
Therefore, c is larger than the optimal level of consumption co = λc∗.F o rT ≥ 2, c0 is
smaller than co and decreases as T increases. Also the consumption from date T onward
becomes almost zero if the government delays the recapitalization until date T.









If the irrecoverable loans N1 are written oﬀ at date 1, the optimal consumption co = λc∗
will be realized along with the equilibrium price 1
λP∗ under the policy (τt,B t)=( τ∗,B∗).
Therefore, in the equilibrium with bank insolvency, the price level before bank re-
capitalization is lower than the optimal price ( 1
λP∗), and the consumption level before
recapitalization is larger than the optimal level (co). The result that the price level after
the shock stays at the original (P∗) indicates that one of the sources of nominal price
rigidity in business cycles may be the government policy or the social norm that prevents
the banks from defaulting on their deposits immediately after their assets are impaired.






{τ∗ + AT−1(1 − λ)}. (30)











ln{1 − (1 − λ)AT−1}. (31)
This equation implies that social welfare decreases as bank recapitalization is delayed
(see Figure 1).
Recapitalization at a date diﬀerent from the expected date T The above argu-
ment is based on the assumption of perfect foresight on the date of bank recapitalization
(T). But since the recapitalization takes place only once, the government can and will
recapitalize the banks at diﬀerent date from the expected date T.
15Suppose that the government recapitalizes the banks at date T0, which is diﬀerent
from the expected date T.( T0 m a yb el a r g e ro rs m a l l e rt h a nT.) Recapitalization at date
T0 is a surprise attack for all economic agents. I formalize the surprise recapitalization
as follows. (1) Since the recapitalization is a surprise, the policy is invariant until date
T0: τt = τ∗,B t = B∗, for t ≤ T0 − 1. Thus the FOCs for consumers and ﬁrms imply
Pt = P∗,c t = c∗ for t ≤ T0.( 2 )S i n c eRT 0−1 = A, the amount of unbacked bank deposits
at date T0 is NT 0 = RT 0−1NT 0−1 = AT 0−1N1, which is equal to the amount of the bonds
that the government injects into the banking system at date T0. (3) Since the price
level and consumption at date T0 are both ﬁxed before the government injects NT 0 into
the banks in this case of surprise recapitalization, all of the injected bonds NT 0 must be
newly issued at date T0. (5) Thus the govenment’s liabilities at the beginning of date
T0 +1a reRT0{B∗ + NT 0},a n dt h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n tf o rt h eg o v e r n m e n ta td a t eT0 +1
is τ00P00c00 = RT 0{B∗ + NT 0} − B00,w h e r e( τ00,P00,c 00,B00) are the variables in the steady
state from date T0 +1o n w a r d .
Therefore, the economic variables can be written as follows:
Pt = P∗,c t = c∗,τt = τ∗,B t = B∗, for t ≤ T0, (32)
Pt = P00,c t = c00,k t = k00,τt = τ00,B t = B00, for t ≥ T0 +1 . (33)
These conditions imply that the surprise recapitalization at date T0 is equivalent to








B∗ and NT 0 =













where τ0 is determined by (25). The government must choose T0 so that τ00 is ﬁnite.
Therefore,
T0 ≤ T






= T − 1. (35)
This condition says that in spite of the people’s expectations concerning the date of bank
recapitalization (T), the government can recapitalize the banks earlier than this date,
and it can also delay the recapitalization up to the time limit T.
164 Concluding remarks
If banks can default on their deposit liabilities when their assets are impaired as a
result of an asset-price bubble collapse or some other macroeconomic shock, the optimal
allocation (ct,k t)=( co,ko) can be realized in a competitive equilibrium. But since bank
deposits circulate in the economy as money, the government generally does not allow
the occurrence of defaults on bank deposits, and people generally expect that it will
not. The government will guarantee the deposits and provide liquidity to banks with the
result that bank deposits in excess of bank assets continue circulating in the economy.
The government has no other choice than to make up for the gap between liabilities and
assets of banks at some point by using taxpayer’s money in order to restore the solvency
of the banking system. But since bank recapitalization policy is politically unpopular,
the government tries to delay recapitalization. This paper examined the consequences
of this unsustainable policy, namely, deposit guarantees (and liquidity support) without
recapitalization of the banking sector.
One of our main ﬁndings is that the government cannot postpone bank recapital-
ization forever. The degree of the impairment of bank assets and other technological
constraints determine the time limit for postponement. If the time limit comes without
recapitalization, the banking system will collapse, and the government will be forced to
make up for the losses from bank insolvency by using taxpayers’ money.
Social welfare decreases as bank recapitalization is delayed. The consumption level
before (after) recapitalization is too high (low) compared with the optimal level. Thus
the price conditions before (after) recapitalization become deﬂationary (inﬂationary).
The reason that the outcome becomes ineﬃcient is the distortion in ﬁnancing the cost
of bank recapitalization: Consumers anticipating a tax increase after recapitalization set
their level of consumption too high for the period before recapitalization. This ineﬃciency
can be avoided if the government allows the occurrence of defaults on bank deposits, i.e.,
bank recapitalization through a lump-sum transfer from consumers. But this is not an
option for a government that wants to maintain the public’s conﬁdence in deposit money.
Thus, in the situation where the government cannot use a lump-sum transfer to
17ﬁnance bank recapitalization, bank insolvency causes distortions of resource allocation
in any case.9
There may be another source of distortion associated with bank insolvency that is
not modeled in this paper. It is uncertain how the cost of making up for the gap between
bank liabilities and assets will be ﬁnanced in a real-life banking crisis. The government
may ﬁnance the cost by, for example, inﬂation (see footnote 9), or increases in labor
taxes or capital taxes. This uncertainty about cost distribution can be an additional
source of ineﬃciency in the model where consumers are risk averse.10
9A noteworthy policy is to set the nominal interest rate on bank deposits (Rt)a tal o w e rl e v e lt h a n
that on bank loans (R
L
t = Aπt,w h e r eπt =
Pt+1
Pt ): a zero nominal interest rate policy. This policy aims
to make up for the irrecoverable loans by inducing inﬂation and thereby generating positive bank proﬁts
(R
L
t −Rt)Ptkt.A s s u m et h a t( 1 )u(c)=c
1−θ (0 < θ < 1); (2) the government can monopolize the banking
sector and can set Rt <R
L
t = Aπt; (3) consumers can hold Bt or Dt, the rate of return on which is Rt,
b u tc a n n o th o l dr e a la s s e t s( kt). In this case, the government can choose Rt = R, g (0 <g<1), and
T,a n ds e tBt such that the banks will be able to make up for their losses on irrecoverable loans in a









tB0 for 1 ≤ t<T,
where γ = g

























Therefore, the government can wipe out Nt in a ﬁnite period by setting g at a small value. But obviously
the consumption allocation is not optimal in this case, and the inﬂation rate becomes high. Moreover,
the assumptions (2) and (3) that are necessary to have a successful elimination of Nt seem too restric-
t i v e . T h u si nr e a l i t y ,az e r on o m i n a li n t e r e s tr a t ep o l i c ym a yn o tb ea b l et oe l i m i n a t et h el o s s e sf r o m
irrecoverable loans; for example, if the assumption (2) does not hold and the rates of returns are set
Rt = R
L
t = 1, then the inﬂation rate becomes negative (πt = A
−1 < 1), and
Nt
Pt grows explosively as
time passes.
10Bad loans that are rolled over may be another source of uncertainty about cost distribution. Since
bank deposits are guaranteed and bank runs are prevented, the banks can rollover bad loans and can allow
the borrower ﬁrms to continue operating. The rolled-over bad loans constitute corporate debt overhang
for the borrowers. This corporate debt overhang brings about uncertainty about cost distribution if there
exists legal uncertainty about the order of seniority of the claims on the borrower ﬁrm held by banks,
new creditors, suppliers, and laborers, since the cost of bank insolvency is borne by other claimants if
the banks successfully recover the bad loans from the borrowers.
18There seem to exist several mechanisms by which the circulation of deposit money on
which banks cannot easily default causes a serious distortion in a case of bank insolvency;
this paper demonstrates one such mechanism.
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